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Code Editor : stig.rules
## This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded ## whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts. ## The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed ## to auditctl. ## ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## Set failure mode to panic -f 2 ## 1) if this is being used on a 32 bit machine, comment out the b64 lines ## 2) These rules assume that login under the root account is not allowed. ## 3) It is also assumed that 500 represents the first usable user account. To ## be sure, look at UID_MIN in /etc/login.defs. ## 4) If these rules generate too much spurious data for your tastes, limit the ## the syscall file rules with a directory, like -F dir=/etc ## 5) You can search for the results on the key fields in the rules ## ## ## (GEN002880: CAT II) The IAO will ensure the auditing software can ## record the following for each audit event: ##- Date and time of the event ##- Userid that initiated the event ##- Type of event ##- Success or failure of the event ##- For I&A events, the origin of the request (e.g., terminal ID) ##- For events that introduce an object into a user’s address space, and ## for object deletion events, the name of the object, and in MLS ## systems, the object’s security level. ## ## Things that could affect time -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex,settimeofday,stime -F key=time-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=time-change -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change # Introduced in 2.6.39, commented out because it can make false positives #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_adjtime -F key=time-change #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_adjtime -F key=time-change -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change ## Things that affect identity -w /etc/group -p wa -k identity -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity ## Things that could affect system locale -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale -w /etc/issue -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k system-locale -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/NetworkManager/ -F perm=wa -F key=system-locale ## Things that could affect MAC policy -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F key=MAC-policy ## (GEN002900: CAT III) The IAO will ensure audit files are retained at ## least one year; systems containing SAMI will be retained for five years. ## ## Site action - no action in config files ## (GEN002920: CAT III) The IAO will ensure audit files are backed up ## no less than weekly onto a different system than the system being ## audited or backup media. ## ## Can be done with cron script ## (GEN002700: CAT I) (Previously – G095) The SA will ensure audit data ## files have permissions of 640, or more restrictive. ## ## Done automatically by auditd ## (GEN002720-GEN002840: CAT II) (Previously – G100-G106) The SA will ## configure the auditing system to audit the following events for all ## users and root: ## ## - Logon (unsuccessful and successful) and logout (successful) ## ## Handled by pam, sshd, login, and gdm ## Might also want to watch these files if needing extra information #-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins #-w /var/run/faillock/ -p wa -k logins #-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins ##- Process and session initiation (unsuccessful and successful) ## ## The session initiation is audited by pam without any rules needed. ## Might also want to watch this file if needing extra information #-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session #-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session #-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session ##- Discretionary access control permission modification (unsuccessful ## and successful use of chown/chmod) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,lchown,fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod ##- Unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,creat,truncate,ftruncate,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,truncate,ftruncate,creat,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,truncate,ftruncate,creat,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=access ##- Use of privileged commands (unsuccessful and successful) ## use find /bin -type f -perm -04000 2>/dev/null and put all those files in a rule like this -a always,exit -F path=/bin/ping -F perm=x -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=privileged ##- Use of print command (unsuccessful and successful) ##- Export to media (successful) ## You have to mount media before using it. You must disable all automounting ## so that its done manually in order to get the correct user requesting the ## export -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=export -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=export ##- System startup and shutdown (unsuccessful and successful) ##- Files and programs deleted by the user (successful and unsuccessful) -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=delete -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=delete ##- All system administration actions ##- All security personnel actions ## ## Look for pam_tty_audit and add it to your login entry point's pam configs. ## If that is not found, use sudo which should be patched to record its ## commands to the audit system. Do not allow unrestricted root shells or ## sudo cannot record the action. -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions ## (GEN002860: CAT II) (Previously – G674) The SA and/or IAO will ##ensure old audit logs are closed and new audit logs are started daily. ## ## Site action. Can be assisted by a cron job ## Not specifically required by the STIG; but common sense items ## Optional - could indicate someone trying to do something bad or ## just debugging #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F key=tracing #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F key=tracing #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -F key=code-injection #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -F key=code-injection #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -F key=data-injection #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -F key=data-injection #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -F key=register-injection #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -F key=register-injection ## Optional - might want to watch module insertion #-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules #-w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules #-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload ## Optional - admin may be abusing power by looking in user's home dir #-a always,exit -F dir=/home -F uid=0 -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -C auid!=obj_uid -F key=power-abuse ## Optional - log container creation #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create ## Optional - watch for containers that may change their configuration #-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config #-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config ## Put your own watches after this point # -w /your-file -p rwxa -k mykey ## Make the configuration immutable - reboot is required to change audit rules -e 2
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